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A CAUTIONARY TALE  
SOME INSIGHTS REGARDING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM FROM THE 
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE  
Maartje de Visser1  
 
 
Abstract 
Courts, whether national or European, are sometimes subject to charges of judicial activism. 
Adopting a comparative perspective, this contribution charts the ways in which constitutional 
courts in the Member States have sought to mitigate or pre-empt charges of activism. The 
primary purpose is to identify attractive solutions or lessons the ECJ may draw in dealing 
with this perception of judicial activism. Section 2 showcases examples of activist behaviour 
of national constitutional courts. This functions as a prelude to some general reflections on 
the role and function of such courts to the extent that the reflections are relevant to questions 
of activism and legitimacy. In section 3, aspects of the jurisdiction of constitutional courts 
and standing rules are considered. These factors help to determine the prominence of these 
courts in the constitutional system and their likelihood of becoming embroiled in deciding 
contentious issues, with implications for their legitimacy. Section 4 looks at various decision-
making techniques used by constitutional courts to safeguard their political legitimacy. It 
discusses the use of deference rhetoric; relying on technical and procedural grounds of 
review; well-balanced reasoning and choosing remedies that avoid an annulment verdict. In 
section 5, the responsibilities of the legislature to also uphold the constitution, in addition to 
constitutional courts, is considered. The contribution concludes that one of the main lessons 
for the European debate is to acknowledge that not all vectors of activism are fully within the 
control of the court. In addition, while national constitutional courts appear to alternate 
periods of judicial activism and restraint, this is more difficult for the ECJ, given the more 
dynaic pace of development and open-ended character of the Union. Finally, it is important 
to realise that most, if not all, of the techniques to mitigate charges of activism involve trade-
offs. To the extent that a choice would be made to counter or pre-empt allegations of activism, 
one possible strategy that the ECJ may want to emulate concerns the way in which national 
constitutional courts communicate in their relationship with the political institutions, which 
should hopefully ameliorate the quality and persuasiveness of its reasoning.  
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1. Introduction  
Courts, whether national or European, are sometimes subject to charges of judicial 
activism. Adopting a comparative perspective, this contribution charts the ways in 
which constitutional courts in the Member States have sought to mitigate or pre-empt 
                                                 
1  This contribution was made possible thanks to the financial support provided by the European 
Research Council (ERC). I wish to thank Monica Claes, Bruno De Witte and Elise Muir and the 
participants in the conference ‘Judicial Activism at the Court of Justice’ for their helpful comments. 
The usual disclaimer applies.  
Published in Judicial Activism at the European Court of Justice. 2013. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. pp.188-210. 
This version dated Jan 2012.
http://doi.org/10.4337/9780857939401.00014
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charges of activism. The primary purpose is to identify attractive solutions or lessons 
the ECJ may draw in dealing with this perception of judicial activism. 
It is important at the outset to be clear about what is meant by ‘judicial activism’. 
Judicial activism is often used as a slogan to communicate dislike or disagreement 
with a particular judgment or line of case law. While such a subjective approach has 
rightly been criticized,2 we should acknowledge that politicians, the media and the 
public regularly employ the term in this derogatory sense. As such, judicial activism 
is closely connected to the way in which these actors perceive the legitimacy of the 
court and its judgments, whereby judicial activism is commonly seen as a legitimacy-
eroding factor.3 Indeed, national debates on the performance of constitutional courts 
are not always framed in terms of judicial activism, but are usually conducted with 
reference to expressions as the ‘proper role’ of the court, ‘judicial lawmaking’ and the 
court’s legitimacy and authority in the eyes of its main interlocutors.  
The remainder of this contribution is structured as follows. Section 2 showcases 
examples of activist behaviour of national constitutional courts. This functions as a 
prelude to some general reflections on the role and function of such courts to the 
extent that the reflections are relevant to questions of activism and legitimacy. In 
section 3, aspects of the jurisdiction of constitutional courts and standing rules are 
considered. These factors help to determine the prominence of these courts in the 
constitutional system and their likelihood of becoming embroiled in deciding 
contentious issues, with implications for their legitimacy. Section 4 looks at various 
decision-making techniques used by constitutional courts to safeguard their political 
legitimacy. It discusses the use of deference rhetoric; relying on technical and 
procedural grounds of review; well-balanced reasoning and choosing remedies that 
avoid an annulment verdict. In each of these substantive sections, I will use examples 
from various jurisdictions to illustrate my main points and subsequently consider the 
possible relevance and application thereof to the Court of Justice. In section 5, the 
responsibilities of the legislature to also uphold the constitution, in addition to 
constitutional courts, is considered. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. A primer on judicial activism in comparative perspective  
To properly situate the discussion, let us begin by considering some examples of 
judicial activism on the national plane.  
On 16 July 1971, the French Conseil constitutionnel rendered what is probably its 
most famous judgment.4 In ruling that a law enabling scrutiny of the purpose of 
political parties before their registration was unconstitutional, it framed its analysis 
with the following phrase: ‘vue la Constitution et notamment son préambule’ (italics 
added). With these last four words, the Conseil constitutionnel elevated the preamble 
– which is the only part of the 1958 constitution to refer to a charter of fundamental 
rights – to a constitutional review standard. This move was completely at odds with 
the intention of the drafters: a reading of the travaux préparatoires reveals that they 
explicitly considered, and rejected, giving the preamble any constitutional value. 
                                                 
2 See eg Aharon Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2008) ch 15 and as 
regards the ECJ, see recently Paul Craig, ‘The ECJ and Ultra Vires Action: A Conceptual Analysis’, 
(2011) 48 CMLR 395.   
3 This term, and its counterpart of legitimacy-boosting factors, is drawn from Başak Çali, Anne Koch 
and Nicola Bruch, The Legitimacy of the European Court of Human Rights: The View from the Ground 
(Strasbourg, 2 May 2011). 
4 Décision no 71-44 DC of 16 July 1971, Freedom of association.  
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In a somewhat comparable fashion, in 1988 the Belgian Court of Arbitration (as 
the constitutional court was known until 2007) acquired the competence to examine 
legislative acts for compatibility with the principle of equal treatment and non-
discrimination, to the exclusion of other fundamental rights. Until then, it had only 
been able to assess laws for compliance with the constitutional distribution of 
competences. One year later, the Belgian court ruled that an infringement of any of 
the fundamental rights amounted to discrimination in the enjoyment of that particular 
right and that it could, therefore, scrutinize laws against all these other fundamental 
rights, read together with the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination.5  
For the first decade of its existence, the Hungarian constitutional court has been 
celebrated and decried as one of the most activist courts in the world.6 It has for 
instance abolished the death penalty by judicial fiat in one of its very first decisions,7 
‘against the overwhelming majority of the population and probably also of 
legislators’.8 
In the Czech Republic, the legal vernacular has been enriched with a new term 
following rulings by the Czech constitutional court challenging acts of the president, 
namely ‘soudcokracie’, which may be translated as ‘courtocracy’.9 The term appears 
for instance in the title of a 2006 book,10 published by a think-thank associated with 
president Klaus, in the aftermath of the judgment by the constitutional court holding 
that while the president may appoint judges, he lacks the power to dismiss them.11  
Finally, in its first abortion decision, the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
‘invented’12 the concept of a protective duty of the state (Schutzpflicht).13 Building on 
earlier case law consecrating fundamental rights as objective principles,14 the court 
held that the state can violate the constitution not only because it itself violates the 
fundamental rights of its citizens, but also by failing to act to protect fundamental 
rights from intrusions by private parties.  
It should be clear, that national constitutional courts can behave in an activist 
fashion. Different aspects of the judicial activity can be considered activist: not only 
the outcome of the case may be relevant here, but also the choice for a particular 
interpretation of constitutional provisions.  
It is important to be clear about which (sort of) cases are most likely to generate 
allegations of activism, as this may have a bearing on the nature of the techniques 
                                                 
5 Judgment 23/89 of 13 October 1989. 
6 See eg John Elster, ‘Constitution-Making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the Boat in the Open Sea’, 
(1993) 71 Public Administration 169; Spencer Zifcak, ‘Hungary’s Remarkable, Radical, Constitutional 
Court’, (1996) 3 Journal of Constitutional Law in Eastern and Central Europe 1.  
7 Decision 23/1990 of 31 October 1990, Capital Punishment.  
8 Christian Boulanger, ‘Europeanisation Through Judicial Activism? The Hungarian Constitutional 
Court’s Legitimacy and Hungary’s “Return to Europe”, in Wojciech Sadurski (ed), Spreading 
Democracy and the Rule of Law (Springer 2006) 272.   
9 For a more general use of the term, see Kim Lane Scheppele, ‘Declarations of Independence: Judicial 
Reactions to Political Pressure’, in Stephen Burbank and Barry Friedman (eds), Judicial Independence 
at the Crossroads (Sage Publications 2002).  
10 See eg CEP, Soudcokracie v CR – fikce, nebo realita? [Courtocracy in the Czech Republic: fiction 
or reality?] (2006).  
11 Pl. ÚS 18/06, Removal of Chief Judges.  
12 Dieter Grimm, ‘Constitutional Issues in Substantive Law – Limits of Constitutional Jurisdiction’, in 
Ingolf Pernice, Juliane Kokott and Cheryl Saunders (eds), The Future of the European Judicial System 
in Comparative Perspective (Nomos 2006) 278.  
13 BVerfG 39, 1. See eg Dieter Grimm, ‘The protective function of the state’ in Georg Nolte (ed), 
European and US Constitutionalism (CUP 2005) 137-155.  
14 BVerfG 7, 198, Lüth.   
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used by courts to prevent or address such charges. National constitutional courts 
exercise various types of jurisdiction. Their classic function is that of controlling the 
legislature, but many of these courts in addition possess ‘ancillary powers’,15 such as 
protecting individual rights in specific cases, hearing electoral petitions or 
impeachment proceedings against the head of state or adjudging the constitutionality 
of political parties. As Ginsburg and Elkins point out, some of these functions quite 
clearly involve judicial lawmaking; others seem like pure cases of dispute resolution 
but may nevertheless have a strong political dimension.16 
Generalizing, we can say that the legitimacy of the court is most at risk when it 
strikes down legislation (and in particular when the judgment is seen to involve the 
setting of policy or choosing of policy outcomes) and when it extends its own 
jurisdiction, as happened in inter alia the French and Belgian examples mentioned 
above. From a relational perspective, then, the main interlocutor of the constitutional 
court is the national legislature,17 as may also be gleaned from the use of ‘the 
countermajoritarian objection’ when it comes to debates on the legitimacy of 
constitutional adjudication at the national level.18  
Finally, constitutional courts cannot, and arguably should not, avoid the limelight 
altogether. As such, a certain degree of behavior that can be considered to involve 
judicial activism should simply be expected as inherent in the choice to establish such 
an institution. According to Ferreres Comella, ‘If we want a forum in which 
constitutional principles are addressed, interpreted, and enforced against legislative 
decisions that erode those principles, courts should not be shy’.19   
Moving to the European level, two differences between the ECJ and national 
constitutional courts should be mentioned. First, the Court’s mandate is broader than 
that of national constitutional courts, because it exercises important non-constitutional 
functions – notably safeguarding the unity of Union law by means of the preliminary 
reference procedure.20 Second, as far as the exercise of the ECJ’s constitutional 
jurisdiction is concerned, the activism discourse mainly targets cases where the ECJ is 
accused of enlarging its own jurisdiction (so similar to the national situation) and 
those involving the demarcation of competences between the Union and the Member 
States, in which case the Member States (and their organs) are the main interlocutor 
for the ECJ. There is much less criticism of excessive activism on the part of the ECJ 
when it seeks to control the European legislature.21 These differences should be borne 
in mind when considering the transferability of national solutions discussed infra to 
the European plane.   
                                                 
15 Tom Ginsburg and Zachery Elkins, ‘Ancillary Powers of Constitutional Courts’, (2009) 87 Texas 
Law Review 1431.  
16 ibid, 1443-1444.  
17  I will therefore not address allegations of activism or illegitimate behaviour originating from 
ordinary courts, who can accuse the constitutional court of invading their remit by engaging in the 
interpretation as opposed to examination of statutes or enlarging the reach of constitutional law by 
attributing horizontal effects to fundamental rights.    
18 This term was coined by Alexander Bickel in The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics (Yale University Press 1986). 
19 Victor Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts & Democratic Values – A European Perspective 
(Yale University Press 2009) 85.  
20 Louis Favoreu, ‘La notion de Cour constitutionnelle’ in Piermanco Zen-Ruffinen and Andreas Auer 
(eds), De la Constitution. Etudes en l’honneur de J-F Aubert (Helbing 1996); Bo Vesterdorf, ‘A 
Constitutional Court for the EU?’, (2006) 4 I-CON 607.  
21 At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the Court often deals with laws adopted by the 
national legislatures and as such, cases involving the demarcation of authority between the Union level 
and the Member States can also be said to involve the relationship between courts and legislatures.  
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3. Jurisdiction of, and access to, constitutional courts  
The easier it is to trigger the involvement of the constitutional court, the more 
disputes can be brought to the court and the more likely it is that the court will be 
drawn into deciding (politically) sensitive or contentious cases – with concomitant 
risks for its legitimacy. Whether it is possible to engage a constitutional court depends 
on the combination of two factors: the scope of its jurisdiction and the rules on locus 
standi. It should be clear that the relevant legal rules are to a large extent determined 
by the drafters of the constitution (or law on the constitutional court). That said, these 
rules will usually require interpretation and as such, the constitutional court is also 
able to influence the precise size of its portfolio and conditions for access. This 
section will illustrate the points just mentioned with a number of examples.  
 
3.1 Jurisdiction   
At times, constitutional courts have engaged in an expansionist reading of their 
competences, enlarging their scope of jurisdiction. Thus, the German 
Bundesverfassungsgericht has accepted the power to entertain challenges to laws 
approving international treaties before their promulgation, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Basic Law does not contemplate a priori review of legal norms. Both houses 
of parliament are allowed to initiate ex ante review and also individuals are permitted 
to lodge a constitutional complaint against such laws.22 In its judgment on the 
Maastricht Treaty, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held that the entitlement of 
individuals to seize the court in this context could be based on Article 38 of the Basic 
Law, which it interpreted to contain a fundamental democratic right to participate in 
the election of members of the Bundestag as the manifestation of popular 
sovereignty.23 Commentators have criticized this approach as conflicting with 
established case law on standing and admissibility.24 Another example can be found 
in the case law of the Czech constitutional court. In its decision 27/09,25 this court 
read its jurisdictional mandate broadly and accepted that its power to examine the 
constitutionality of parliamentary statutes extended to constitutional acts, i.e. acts with 
amend or supplement the constitution, for conformity with the essential requirements 
of a democratic state governed by the rule of law.26  
A constitutional court may have good reasons to engage in jurisdictional self-
empowerment. The explanation for the stance of the Bundesverfassungsgericht can 
arguably be found in the desire of this court to ensure that it is able to define the 
constitutional limits to European treaties that transfer substantial competences and 
expound its philosophy on the wider European integration process27 – and to do so at 
a time when its judgment may carry the greatest weight. The Czech constitutional 
court has reasoned that were it not competent to examine constitutional acts ‘the 
protection of constitutionality would be illusory, because a constitutional act could be 
                                                 
22 BVerfG 108, 370. Note that members of parliament may also lodge constitutional complaints in their 
capacity as German citizens, see BVerfG 64, 301.  
23 2 BverfG 2134/92 and 2 BverfG 2159/92.  
24 Jürgen Schwarze, ‘Europapolitik under deutschem Verfassungsgerichtsvorbehalt’, (1994) 48 Neue 
Justiz 1.  
25 Pl. ÚS 27/09 of 9 October 2009 Constitutional Act on Shortening the Term of Office of the Chamber 
of Deputies.  
26 Art 9(1) and Art 39(4) Czech constitution.  
27 The Bundesverfassungsgericht has authored a long line of case law outlining its stance vis-à-vis 
European treaties and European legislative measures, eg BverfG 37, 271 (Solange I), BverfG 73, 339 
(Solange II). 
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used to do anything, with no opportunity to defend oneself against it before the 
Constitutional Court’.28 A broad reading of judicial competences can thus typically be 
explained by the belief of the justices that this is necessary for the court to properly 
execute its role as the guardian of the constitution. It can be a matter of debate 
whether a court is still acting intra vires when it delivers such rulings.29 Even on the 
assumption that it is, ‘it does not follow that the court’s actions are unproblematic 
from the point of view of legitimacy in a broader, critical sense of the word’.30  
 
Conversely, there are also instances where it is the (constitutional) legislature which 
has conferred powers upon a constitutional court that are especially prone to threaten 
the court’s political legitimacy. This holds in particular for abstract review by means 
of annulment actions.31 A combination of three factors underlies this perception. First, 
the abstract character of this procedure means that there is no specific dispute to 
connect – and confine – the constitutional issues to and that the court is thus very 
much evaluating the legislature’s work as is for constitutional conformity. This is 
considered to detract from the adjudicatory nature of the proceedings and make them 
more akin to legislative deliberations. Second, proceedings can be initiated by those 
holding a political office; notably including groups of parliamentarians. In practice, 
these tend to be MPs belonging to the opposition, who have been outvoted during 
parliamentary debate on the statute now brought before the court. It can readily be 
appreciated that their decision to initiate constitutional review will not always or only 
be inspired by a general public concern to ensure that laws with doubtful 
constitutional credentials are invalidated. Third, this procedure is usually initiated 
relatively soon following a law’s publication, meaning that political emotions and 
partisan feelings might not yet have cooled down.  
These issues can be exacerbated if the constitutional court can review 
legislative bills for their constitutionality. Thus, until 1998, the Hungarian 
constitutional court could receive challenges to draft acts of parliament at any stage of 
the legislative process.32 Shortly after its introduction, 52 MPs petitioned the court for 
a priori review of various provisions of the bill for a compensation act, that sought to 
regulate reparations for expropriations carried out during the communist regime.33 
The court rejected the petition and in doing so, expounded a much narrower 
                                                 
28 Official press release 2.  
29 To the extent that it is not, we could be faced with a lesser version of the ‘original sin’ criticism 
directed at the US Supreme Court following its judgment in Marbury v Madison where it bestowed 
upon itself the power of judicial constitutional review.  
30 Wojciech Sadurski, Rights Before Courts – A Study of Constitutional Courts in Postcommunist 
States of Central and Eastern Europe (Springer 2005) 34.  
31 Another procedure to be mentioned here is that for establishing a legislative omission, which exists 
in Hungary and Poland. By means of this procedure, the constitutional court effectively induces the 
exercise of powers by pronouncing that the legislature has failed to enact the legal rules necessary to 
execute certain constitutional requirements. See more generally the XIVth Congress of the Conference 
of European Constitutional Courts in 2008, which dealt with ‘Problems of Legislative Omission in 
Constitutional Jurisprudence’. Comparative insights on the functioning of this procedure and any 
threats that it poses for judicial legitimacy could be used when considering the way in which the ECJ 
uses Art 265 TFEU.  
32 Formerly § 33 constitutional court act. A somewhat comparable situation prevails in Romania, where 
ex ante review of laws before their promulgation is possible, which often happens ‘on political interests 
rather than on constitutional grounds’, Renate Weber, ‘The Romanian Constitutional Court: In Search 
of its Own Identity’ in Wojciech Sadurski (ed), Constitutional Justice, East and West (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 291.  
33 Decision 16 of 1991, In the matter of the petition on compensation (‘compensation case II’).  
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understanding of its ability to engage in a priori review than contemplated by the 
relevant legal rules:  
 
[The Constitutional Court Act] may permit the Constitutional Court to be 
involved in the legislative process at any stage and on any number of 
occasions. This way, the Constitutional Court, by its decision, influences, and, 
by ruling out certain solutions, even determines the course of the debate in 
such a way that at the same time it secures the constitutionality of the 
legislative process. The Constitutional Court is not an advisor to Parliament 
but the judge of the result of Parliament’s legislative work. The purpose of 
preventive norm control, i.e. preventing the enactment of an unconstitutional 
Act of Parliament, and the judicial function of the Constitutional Court may be 
reconciled in case of a review on the merits if the final text of the Bill is 
submitted to the Constitutional Court either prior to voting on the Bill or after 
voting but still before promulgation.34  
 
Notwithstanding this restrictive interpretation of its competences, the feeling that the 
court was acting ultra vires, in the sense of engaging in lawmaking rather than 
judging, persisted among certain segments of the general public.35Parliament 
eventually recognized the shortcomings of this type of a priori review and passed an 
amendment to the constitutional court act to abrogate this procedure in February 
1998.36 Even this legislative bill was sent to the court for a priori scrutiny, with the 
challenges presented by the petitioners all being duly rejected.37  
 This all explains why academics such as Ackerman have suggested that 
abstract review should be eliminated and that constitutional courts should only 
exercise powers of concrete review, that is, examine the constitutional validity of 
legislation in the context of an actual legal dispute.38 One of the consequences of such 
an approach is that under concrete review, it is far easier for a court to practice the 
‘passive virtues’ extolled by Bickel,39 which include such techniques as ripeness, 
mootness, the political question doctrine40 or the void for vagueness doctrine, in order 
to reduce their involvement in controversial or sensitive constitutional issues and 
thereby protect themselves from a potential political backlash.  
 
So let us briefly consider the European Court of Justice. The Treaties bestow upon the 
Court quite a generous jurisdiction. This includes the competence to adjudicate 
annulment actions, so any change in jurisdictional ambit along the lines suggested by 
Ackerman is mostly beyond the Court’s capacity. Further, and from a Rule of Law 
perspective, the ECJ should be congratulated for judgments such as Les Verts,41 
                                                 
34 ibid.  
35 Georg Brunner, ‘Structure and Proceedings of the Hungarian Constitutional Judiciary’ in László 
Sólyom and Georg Brunner, Constitutional Judiciary in a New Democracy: The Hungarian 
Constitutional Court (University of Michigan Press 2000) 79.  
36 Law I. 1998.  
37 Decision 66 of 1997.  
38 Bruce Ackerman, The Future of the Liberal Revolution (Yale University Press 1992) 108.  
39 Bickel (n 18). 
40 On the difficulties and challenges of dealing with political questions before constitutional courts in 
central and eastern Europe, see Renata Uitz, ‘Constitutional Courts in Central and Eastern Europe: 
What Makes a Question Too Political?’, (2007) Juridica 47-59.  
41 Case 294/83 Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339.  
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Pupino42 and Gestores Pro Amnistia43 and the reform of its jurisdiction over matters 
falling within the former second and third pillars can similarly be welcomed.44 Yet, 
when one considers these developments from the viewpoint of judicial wisdom, the 
Court should take care to exercise prudence in defining the outer limits of its 
jurisdiction, including when it comes to embracing the addition of new competences.  
 
3.2 Rules on locus standi  
The likelihood or ability of a court to behave in an activist fashion is – aside from its 
mandate – also dependent on the opportunity for litigants to seize the court and the 
litigants’ interest in advancing the role of the court. As one commentator explains:  
 
Setting up a designated constitutional court, accessible only to a narrow set of 
organs, has the effect of limiting the insurance function of the constitutional 
court. (…) Open access decentralizes the monitoring function widely and 
makes it more likely that politicians will be challenged in court should they 
fail to abide by constitutional limitation.45 
 
Experiences in inter alia France, Hungary, Poland and Germany confirm this last 
point. In France, standing for annulment actions was initially restricted to the 
president of the republic, the prime minister and national assembly and senate 
presidents. What happened in practice is that these four public institutions tended to 
belong to the same political party. They accordingly had very little incentive to 
exercise this right. Between 1959 and 1974, only eight parliamentary enactments were 
referred for constitutionality review. To enhance the position of parliamentary 
minorities, a constitutional amendment was adopted in 1974 that granted standing to 
60 deputies or 60 senators. Opposition parliamentarians reacted with gusto to their 
newly acquired right46 and today, most controversial laws will find their way to the 
Conseil constitutionnel by means of a referral by members belonging to the 
parliamentary minority. The Hungarian law allowing the death penalty, mentioned 
earlier, was referred to the constitutional court by an NGO. In Poland, the 
ombudsman and trade unions (amongst others) enjoy a right of access to the 
constitutional tribunal in the context of annulment actions.47 These actors regularly 
submit cases: the ombudsman brought 16 applications in 1998, 15 in 1999, 19 in 2000 
and 14 in 2001 and trade unions filed respectively 14, 9, 13 and 16 cases, as compared 
to 2, 3, 4 and 7 challenges filed by MPs.48 And in Germany, over 96 per cent of all the 
applications lodged with the Bundesverfassungsgericht between 1951 and 2005 took 
                                                 
42 Case C-105/03 Criminal proceedings against Maria Pupino [2005] ECR I-5285.  
43 Case C-354/04 P Gestoras Pro Amnistia, Olano and Errasti v Council [2007] ECR I-1579.  
44 For an overview of the development of judicial control over the activities in these pillars, see Alicia 
Hinarejos, Judicial Control in the European Union – Reforming Jurisdiction in the Intergovernmental 
Pillars (OUP 2009).   
45 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies – Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (CUP 
2003) 36-37.  
46 Within five years of the 1974 amendment, 25 challenges had been filed by deputies or senators, with 
only a single challenge brought by one of the original institutions.  
47 Art 191 of the Polish constitution. The ombudsman is a privileged applicant; trade unions only have 
access to the constitutional tribunal as regards legal norms that concern matters relevant to the scope of 
their activity.  
48 Lech Garlicki, ‘The Experience of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal’, in Sadurski (n 33) 274. 
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the form of a constitutional complaint, brought by individuals alleging a violation of 
her fundamental rights by a public authority.49  
 
Here too, constitutional courts have at times engaged in a narrow reading of the 
relevant legal rules. For example, the Polish constitutional tribunal has engaged in 
self-restriction by tightening the admissibility criteria for constitutional complaints. 
The tribunal did so clearly in its decision SK 10/01, where it held that the general 
principle of equality was a ‘second-degree right’ and could not be relied on as an 
independent basis for a constitutional complaint, which requires the litigant to allege 
an infringement of his or her subjective rights.50 It thereby limited the range of 
situations where an individual can seize the constitutional tribunal to complain that a 
law creates unequal treatment. This should not be underestimated given that, as 
Robertson points out, ‘one specific constitutional value often seems to dominate 
constitutional discourse – the value of non-discrimination’ which is caused by the fact 
that ‘nearly all policy requires discrimination’.51 Another illustration can be found in 
the restrictive approach taken by the Bundesverfassungsgericht when it comes to 
accepting preliminary references: it will only do so if the ordinary court is genuinely 
convinced of the unconstitutionality of the law referred and if it was not possible to 
resolve the case without deciding the constitutional question.52 Finally, in Hungary, 
where ‘everyone’ enjoys the right to initiate annulment actions challenging statutes,53 
the constitutional court itself has proposed to change the standing rules such that only 
certain public institutions would retain a right of access in the context of this 
procedure.54   
 
The rules on locus standi at the European level, notably as far as Article 263 TFEU is 
concerned, are relatively dynamic in that access has progressively been extended over 
the course of various Treaty revisions. To the extent that this development would 
continue, a word of caution may be in order. To be sure, access to court is an 
important constitutional principle that warrants due respect and cases such as 
Chernobyl55 can be appreciated in this vein. Yet, from a perspective of judicial 
legitimacy, certain limits may be in order and while this is in the first place a matter 
for the Member States as Herren der Verträge, it also bears relevance for the Court of 
Justice in interpreting the access rules. From a comparative perspective and as far as 
cases involve the Court’s constitutional jurisdiction, one might thus even be able to 
                                                 
49  Data available on the website of the court, 
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/organization/verfassungsbeschwerde.html (accessed 13 
November 2011).  
50 Decision of 24 October 2001. Note however the strong dissents in the case, with judge Garlicki 
relying on a moral viewpoint of the role of the court to support a wider interpretation that that 
professed by the majority: ‘Given the existence of any doubt, constitutional provisions should be 
interpreted in such a manner as to facilitate the realisation of this [the Constitution’s] system of values 
to the fullest possible extent’, which results in ‘the obligation to interpret the Constitution in a manner 
most favourable to the protection of an individual’s rights and freedoms’.  
51 David Robertson, The Judge as Political Theorist: Contemporary Constitutional Review (Princeton 
University Press 2010) 7 and 18 respectively.  
52  For criticism of this approach, Christoph Möllers, ‘Report on a Missing Debate: Scope and 
Legitimacy of Judicial Review in German Constitutional Law’, paper presented at the conference 
‘Judicial Review: Why, Where and for Whom?’, Jerusalem, 31 May – 1 June 2009, 7.  
53 Art 32/a (3) Hungarian constitution and Art 1(b) read together with Art 21(2) Act XXXII of 1989 on 
the Constitutional Court. 
54 Brunner (n 35) 81.   
55 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council (“Chernobyl”) [1990] ECR I-2041.  
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defend the ECJ’s choice not to discard its Plaumann test56 in favor of a more lenient 
interpretation of the admissibility criteria for individuals in the context of the 
European annulment procedure.  
 
4. Techniques of judicial decision-making  
So, what do constitutional courts do to mitigate charges of activism and safeguard 
their political legitimacy once they have been properly seized? This section examines 
four techniques that can be useful: explicitly mentioning the need for deference to the 
legislature; adopting a narrow approach to the grounds for review; ensuring balancing 
reasoning; and choosing remedies that avoid striking down the law under scrutiny.  
 
4.1. The importance of deference rhetoric 
Constitutional judiciaries in Europe usually take care to emphasize the need for 
deference to the elected legislature and typically do so in the opening paragraphs of 
their reasoning. There are various ways in which judicial deference finds expression. 
Very common is the presumption of constitutionality of legislation and the 
corresponding requirement of a certain threshold that must be crossed before the 
constitutional court will be persuaded to void a law. For instance, the Conseil 
constitutionnel has developed a ‘manifest error’ test: ‘Considérant que l’appréciation 
portée par le législateur sur la nécessité des nationalisations décidées par la loi 
soumise à l’examen du Conseil constitutionnel ne saurait, en l’absence d’erreur 
manifeste, être récusée (emphasis added)’.57 Similarly, the Polish constitutional 
tribunal has declared that: ‘[t]he burden of argument is on those who challenge the 
constitutionality of a law and unless they produce a specific and convincing legal 
argument to prove their points, the Constitutional Tribunal will recognize the laws 
under challenge as constitutional’.58  
In a similar fashion, constitutional courts frequently emphasize that the 
legislature possesses wide discretion in making policy choices and that it is not for the 
court to second-guess such decisions. Thus, in its early case law, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht stated that:  
 
The Constitutional Court is not authorized to judge the wisdom of legislation 
(…) The Constitutional Court must examine such measures [providing 
investment aid for certain firms] only to the extent of determining whether the 
legislature has observed the ultimate limits of its discretionary power and 
whether it has abused that power.59 
  
Echoing these sentiments, the Conseil constitutionnel has held that ‘[i]t is not for the 
Constitutional Council, which does not have a general discretionary decision-making 
power comparable to that of Parliament, to call into question the provisions enacted 
by the legislature on the basis of the state of knowledge and techniques’.60  
                                                 
56 Case 25/62 Plaumann & Co. v Commission [1963] ECR 95.  
57 Décision 81-132 DC of 16 January 1981, Nationalisation Law I.  
58 Adapted from Sadurski (n 30) 98.  
59 4 BVerfG 7, 1954 (excerpts of the judgment in English can be found in Donald Kommers, The 
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (2nd rev edn, Duke University Press 
1997).   
60  Décision 2001-446 DC of 27 June 2001, Voluntary interruption of Pregnancy (Abortion) and 
Contraception Act.  
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The general point here can be stated in simple terms: judicial restraint must not 
only be done, it must also be seen to be done. True, in some instances utterances of 
restraint have been more rhetorical than anything else, but this does not detract from 
the fact that the constitutional justices still consider it appropriate and necessary to 
include such statements. The ECJ, in contrast, appears rather less concerned with 
employing deference rhetoric. Sentiments about the proper roles of the legislature and 
the Court are not commonly included in judgments; rather, after resolving 
admissibility issues (where applicable), the Court tends to immediately carry out the 
scrutiny test.61 A change in the direction of the practice of national constitutional 
courts seems like a relatively easy and cost-efficient way to reduce the likelihood of 
allegations of activism.  
 
4.2. Grounds of judicial review  
When it comes to examining the constitutionality of legislation, constitutional courts 
may choose to limit themselves to establishing compliance with procedural as 
opposed to more substantive grounds. This technique is often used by the Polish 
constitutional tribunal. An example is its ruling in the National Broadcasting Council 
case.62 The law under scrutiny sought to enhance presidential influence over the 
National Broadcasting Council, a body with substantial regulatory powers in relation 
to electronic media. Adopted in the wake of the 2005 presidential elections, it was 
rushed through parliament and almost immediately challenged on a number of 
grounds. One of these was that the act had actually been adopted by means of the 
special ‘urgent’ legislative procedure, which does not allow for modifications to the 
structure of public bodies such as the National Broadcasting Council.63 The Polish 
Tribunal acknowledged that the law was adopted very rapidly and that not all the 
steps associated with the normal legislative procedure had been taken. However, since 
the Tribunal could not find any express reference to the constitutional provision 
dealing with the urgent legislative procedure in the text of the law, it held that the law 
had been properly adopted. While making use of a strict textual analysis, combined 
with reliance on procedural grounds, may be beneficial from a legitimacy perspective, 
it can make for technocratic and publicly unconvincing judgments. This may damage 
the popular legitimacy of constitutional courts.  
Another factor of influence in this respect concerns the (in)ability of constitutional 
courts to consider grounds for review ex officio. The Estonian and Polish courts are 
for instance explicitly restricted to the limits of the original petition.64 Conversely, the 
Slovenian justices ‘shall not be bound to the proposal given in a request or initiative 
[to evaluate a statute]’.65 Similarly, in the feminine quotas case mentioned earlier, the 
                                                 
61 See e.g. Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09 Volker und Markus Schecke GbR and Hartmut Eifert v 
Land Hessen, para 43 and further. Also when it comes to cases where the ECJ deals with national 
legislation, any reflections on the room for manoeuvre for the national legislature (usually in the form 
of a margin of discretion) tend to appear in the justificatory phase of the scrutiny test, rather than 
precede it in order to frame the discussion. Matters are somewhat different when the Treaty-makers are 
concerned, where instances of deference can be more easily identified, see e.g. Case C-50/00P Unión 
de Pequeños Agricultores v Council [2002] ECR I-6677, para 45 in particular.  
62 Judgment of 23 March 2006, K4/06 Modifications to the composition and functioning of the National 
Broadcasting Council.   
63 Art 123 of the Polish constitution.  
64 Art 66 of the law on the Polish constitutional tribunal and Art 4(3) of the Estonian law on 
constitutional review court procedure. 
65 Art 30 of the Slovenian constitutional court act.  
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French Conseil constitutionnel based its verdict of annulment on a ground that it had 
adduced ex officio.  
Translated to the Court of Justice, it can thus be sensible for the Court to decide a 
case on limited, procedural grounds. At the same time, and depending on the 
circumstances of the case, doing so may be perceived as the court ducking the real 
issue at stake;66 and a failure to rise to the constitutional occasion may engender 
similar risks for a court’s legitimacy as being overly eager in checking laws for 
constitutionality.  
 
4.3. Quality of judicial reasoning  
Most constitutional courts also take care to carefully address the arguments both 
parties bring to the table. They try to avoid a decision that reads as if the answer to the 
constitutional issue was unequivocal, and thereby acknowledge that constitutional 
provisions – notably those concerning fundamental rights – are to a greater or lesser 
degree indeterminate.67 An exception is the French Conseil constitutionnel, whose 
judgments are crafted to express the idea that it is the constitution itself, and not the 
judges, that has decided the matter. This approach, however, can create a backlash, as 
happened in the feminine quotas case, where the deputies who saw ‘their’ law fail 
were ‘outraged by the Conseil appearing to take no notice of the views of the act’s 
legislative supporters’.68 Indeed, to the extent that textually-grounded judgments are 
not feasible or seem artificial, this tactic can do more harm than good.  
It can be readily appreciated that having a one-sided line of reasoning in the 
judgment is not effective in convincing the losing party that the court has arrived at 
the ‘correct’ outcome and that it should accept its defeat. Rather, the losing party may 
be motivated to continue to expound its views and seek recognition of their merits, 
but through another outlet – such as the media – and complain that the court decides 
cases ‘politically’. As such, a premium is placed on the clarity and persuasiveness of 
judicial reasoning. That said, it might on occasion be difficult for the justices to reach 
agreement on the precise meaning to be given to a constitutional provision and 
whether a statute therefore passes constitutional muster. It is precisely to reflect the 
special character of the constitution as a reference standard that a number of 
constitutional courts have the possibility to issue concurring and dissenting opinions, 
in deviation from the normal practice in civil law countries of having a single 
judgment.69 For instance, when the Bundesverfassungsgericht was first established, 
provision was made for single judgments and it was only later, in response inter alia 
to the clear preferences of the judges themselves that the possibility of giving separate 
opinions was introduced.70  
The point here is not to insist that the ECJ too should introduce dissenting 
opinions, if only because there are also costs associated with such a choice that ought 
                                                 
66 This is arguably what happened in Case C-301/06 Ireland v Parliament and Council [2009] ECR I-
593, involving a challenge to the data retention directive. The ECJ restricted itself to an examination of 
the choice of legal basis, without confronting what many considered to be the real issue with the 
directive, namely its compatibility with fundamental rights.   
67 On the indeterminacy of fundamental rights and the implications for the role of judges, see in 
particular Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 2001).  
68 Robertson (n 51) 154. The judgment in question was Décision 82-146 DC of 18 November 1982. 
This was one of the instances were the constitution was eventually amended to overrule the Conseil 
constitutionnel, namely by Constitutional Act 99-569 of 8 July 1999. 
69 This is the case for instance in Germany, Spain and Poland.    
70 Kommers (n 59) 21.   
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to be carefully considered.71 Rather, it is to emphasize that also from a national 
comparative perspective, there is merit in insisting that the Court should be more 
explicit in acknowledging the merits of possible counter-arguments and more 
convincing in the reasoning that supports its decisions.72 By doing so, the addressees 
of its judgment can more readily understand why certain legislative choices have been 
struck down and, importantly, what avenues still remain available to them to pursue 
their aims and policies.   
 
4.4. Saving and delaying constructions  
When it comes to the actual scrutiny of legislation, constitutional courts will normally 
try to avoid rendering a decision of unconstitutionality if this is possible. Two 
techniques in particular are considered useful in this respect. The first is ‘constitution-
conform interpretation’, whereby the court will find that the law is constitutional, but 
only if it is read in accordance with guidelines that have been included in the 
judgment. These guidelines can take various forms: the court can for instance ‘add in’ 
certain requirements into the contested legislative provision or conversely, ‘read 
down’ legislative provisions. An example of the former type can be found in the 
decision on the act prohibiting the concealing of the face in public by the Conseil 
constitutionnel.73 The ban itself could be found in section 1 of the contested statute 
and stipulated that ‘No one shall, in any public space, wear clothing designed to 
conceal the face’. The Conseil constitutionnel reasoned that the ban in general was 
not disproportionate, but added a judicial qualification: ‘However, prohibiting the 
concealing of the face in public cannot, without adversely affecting Article 10 of the 
Declaration [of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789], result in restricting the 
exercising of religious freedom in places of worship open to the public’.  
An example of the latter type is offered by a 2009 ruling of the Belgian constitutional 
court examining an anti-racism law.74 Article 21 of this law criminalized the mere act 
of spreading ideas based on racial superiority or racial hatred. The court held that 
what the legislature actually sought was to criminalize behavior that was intended to 
instigate hatred in relation to a certain group of people and aims to justify the creation 
of a policy involving discrimination or segregation in relation to this particular 
group.75 ‘On condition of this interpretation’, the court continued, could the contested 
article be considered compatible with constitutional standards on freedom of 
                                                 
71 These include the risk that the independence of the judges may suffer, as dissenting opinions may 
make it easier for Member States to keep an eye on ‘their’ judge to see whether he or she furthers that 
State’s interest in judicial decision-making, with possible ramifications when the question of re-
election for another term at the Court has to be decided – or conversely, that a judge eager to secure re-
election makes strategic use of the possibility to publish dissenting opinions. In addition, to the extent 
that one values the need for a uniform interpretation of EU law, allowing dissenting opinions can 
jeopardize the desired uniformity, with associated repercussions for legal certainty and perhaps even 
the authority of the Court’s pronouncements. In favour of dissenting opinions, mainly because it allows 
the Court to connect better with European citizens, Vlad Perju, ‘Reason and Authority in the European 
Court of Justice’, (2009) 49 Virginia Journal of International Law 307.  
72 For a recent example of a very thinly reasoned judgment, see Case C-34/09 Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano 
v Office national de l’emploi (ONEM) [2011] nyr.  
73 Décision 2010-613 DC of 7 October 2010. The technique of what in French constitutional law are 
known as ‘réserves d’interprétation’ was introduced in Décision 80-127 DC of 20 January 1981, 
Security and Liberty.  
74 Judgment nr 17/2009 of 12 February 2009.  
75 B 74.4.  
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expression. Other constitutional courts that have used this technique include the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht76 and the Polish constitutional tribunal.77  
Various reasons can be offered that explain the use of this technique. The 
court can be seen to accord due respect to the legislature by keeping its laws in 
existence, or, more strategically, is able to avoid an open confrontation with the 
parliamentary majority. This technique can also be appreciated as economically 
efficient, in that the legislature need not dedicate scarce resources to the drafting of a 
new law. However, although the technique may be inspired by considerations of 
judicial restraint, it should be clear that in actually applying it, courts can be quite 
active and engage in judicial lawmaking by re-drafting legislation in a way that can 
contradict the legislature’s intentions – as the Belgian example illustrates.78 What is 
more, unless the legislature disagrees so strongly that it is willing to replace the re-
interpreted law with a new version, the judicial solution is likely to remain in 
existence, whereas a verdict of unconstitutionality would have placed the matter back 
in the hands of the legislature.  
For the ECJ these insights would mean that while the use of this technique79 
may seem attractive as an instrument to mitigate open clashes with the legislature in 
political or sensitive cases, depending on the judicial creativity in reading in or 
reading down legislative provisions, allegations of activism may actually be invited 
through the backdoor.  
 
A second technique sees constitutional courts indicating that the law under review is 
or will (soon) become unconstitutional, but rather than annulling this law, they invite 
the legislature to act. This technique has been used for instance by the Italian Corte 
costituzionale, which can adopt rulings of ‘unconstitutionality verified but not 
declared’ (inconstitucionalità accertata ma non dichiarata) if it seems to be sure 
about the unconstitutionality of a law, but prefers to give a sort of ultimatum to the 
legislature before quashing the statute. In a comparable fashion, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht can limit itself to declaring the ‘incompatibility’ 
(Unvereinbarkeit) of a law with the constitution, thereby avoiding a determination of 
the ex tunc nullity of the law.80 Both courts can also issue verdicts of temporary 
constitutionality, which state that the contested law is as yet in line with the 
constitution, but will soon cease to be and appeal to the legislature to act to achieve a 
fully constitutional situation.81 These techniques are often used when courts are faced 
with highly political cases82 or when they fear that striking down a law would create a 
                                                 
76 Eg BVerfG 30, 1 and BVerfG 54, 251.  
77 For instance judgment of 3 April 2001, K32/99Classification of goods and services and sources of 
tax law.  
78 This technique can also give rise to judgments where the verdict of constitutionality conditional upon 
a saving construction is highly artificial. A noteworthy example is the recent judgment of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht on the aid measures for Greece and the Euro rescue package, 2 BVerfG 
978/10; 2 BVerfG 1485/10 and 2 BVerfG 1099/10. The law in question intentionally only required the 
government to attempt to obtain the agreement of the Bundestag before giving guarantees, which the 
Court re-formulated as an obligation incumbent on the government to obtain parliamentary approval.  
79 The ECJ for instance used this technique in Case C-149/10 Zoi Chatzi v Ipourgos Ikonomikon [2010] 
nyr.  
80 See eg 87 BVerfG 130, Josefine Mutzenbacher.  
81  These are called doppia pronuncia (literally: double rulings) in Italian constitutional law and 
Appelentscheidungen (appeal judgments) in German constitutional law.  
82 This appears to be the main motivating factor for the Corte costituzionale, cf Tania Groppi, ‘The 
Italian Constitutional Court: Towards a ‘Multilevel System’ of Constitutional Review?’, (2008) 3 
Journal of Comparative Law 100, 109.  
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situation that is even less in accordance with the constitution than the actual status 
quo.83 They could be usefully emulated by the ECJ if it is faced with similar 
quandaries, and can thereby supplement its existing arsenal of maintaining the effects 
of a legal act that it has voided or limiting the temporal effect of a verdict of 
annulment.84  
 
5. Moving away from a monopolistic view on constitutional review  
National constitutional courts are usually appointed by the constitution as its primary 
guardian. However, these courts do not hold a monopoly on constitutional 
interpretation and review: non-judicial institutions also have a responsibility in this 
respect. This too is recognized by the constitution: heads of state and MPs, for 
example, typically have to take an oath upon accepting their office, which includes 
the promise to uphold the constitution. Now, to the extent that the legislature (or other 
non-judicial actors) devotes sufficient time and serious attention to the constitutional 
dimension of proposed legislation, there would be less need for the constitutional 
court to intervene to correct constitutionally aberrant outcomes. In other words, the 
court would less frequently be required to engage in behavior that may be considered 
to involve judicial activism or otherwise jeopardize its political legitimacy.  
However, this is not always what happens in practice. The existence of a 
constitutional judiciary may induce MPs to become indifferent or lethargic about the 
articulation of constitutional provisions in the course of the legislative process. This 
could perversely result in a greater proportion of laws being adopted that contravene 
the constitution, as the parliamentary debate will only address the expediency of 
adopting a statute and not feature reflections regarding the statute’s constitutional 
permissibility. As Tushnet explains, ‘Legislators may define their jobs as excluding 
considerations of the Constitution precisely because the courts are there’.85 This is a 
concern that is considered particularly pressing in relation to the central and eastern 
countries: parliaments there were perceived to have weak democratic credentials, with 
parliamentary distrust being a legacy from the previous political regime; and 
constitutional courts, as newly minted institutions, were ushered in as the hallmark of 
the transformation to a constitutional democracy and given a wide range of powers to 
boot.86 To the extent that legislatures fail to rise to the constitutional occasion, citizens 
may have difficulty in overcoming misgiving about the quality of parliament’s work, 
which inhibits the creation of an enduring constitutional democracy. Further, and 
more important for present purposes, is that the constitutional court will frequently be 
required to sanction the legislature and it may have to do so in unequivocal and 
powerful terms. Restraint and deference seem difficult to achieve under such 
circumstances. 
Alternatively, the legislature can take the constitution seriously, but focus too 
much on the court’s articulation of the meaning of the constitution – rather than 
proffer its own reading of constitutional provisions. This so-called judicialization of 
                                                 
83 This was the reason offered by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in Mutzenbacker (n 80).  
84 For a case where the Court uses a version of the technique of temporary constitutionality and allows 
the European legislature a brief period of time to rectify mistakes in an EU measure, see Joined Cases 
C-402/05P and C-415/P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351, paras 372-376.  
85 Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University Press 1999) 58. 
86 See eg Sadurski (n 30) in particular ch 5; Andras Sajo, ‘Reading the Invisible Constitution: Judicial 
Review in Hungary’, (1995) 15 OJLS 253. 
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the legislative debate has been observed in both France and Germany.87 It may be 
readily appreciated that also in this scenario, the constitutional court still takes center 
stage, is required to decide novel constitutional issues, and can accordingly be faced 
with claims of activism.88  
The key, then, is to ensure that the legislature also assumes responsibility for 
upholding the constitution and does so by offering its own interpretation of 
constitutional provisions. Here the constitutional court can call upon the political 
institutions to play their part.89 A good example is the judgment by the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht in the second Parliamentary Dissolution case, on the 
question whether the chancellor could ask the federal president to dissolve the 
Bundestag after he had engineered a vote of no-confidence so that new elections 
could be held (a precondition for dissolution pursuant to Article 68 of the Basic 
Law).90 The court stated that: 
 
Article 68(1) is an open-ended constitutional provision in need of 
concretization.  
Concretizing Article 68(1) is a function not only of the Federal Constitutional 
Court; this duty is also vested in other supreme constitutional organs [such as 
the federal president and the Bundestag].  
When [concretizing Article 68(1)], the highest constitutional organs must 
adhere to prior constitutional rulings and to the basic political judgments 
[found in the Basic Law]. In giving specific meaning to the Constitution as a 
basic legal order, they must implement [their decisions] consistently and with 
a view to their long-term impact. This is especially true because a high degree 
of consensus among the supreme constitutional organs of the Federal Republic 
is necessary when they are called upon to assess all the constitutional and 
political aspects of the situation.  
 
In addition, the court in its judgments and individual justices in extra-judicial writings 
should avoid excessive posturing as the sole voice in determining the meaning of the 
constitution and engage in institutional self-aggrandizement. Of course, when the 
legislature engages with constitutional interpretation during the legislative debate, the 
court should duly acknowledge this fact – not in the least because it avoids the 
impression that the court is the first to pronounce on a given constitutional issue – and  
                                                 
87 For France, see Alex Stone Sweet, ‘Where Judicial Politics are Legislative Politics: The French 
Constitutional Council’, (1992) 15 West European Politics 29; Alex Stone Sweet, Governing with 
Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (OUP 2000). For Germany, see Klaus von Beymne, ‘The 
German Constitutional Court in an Uneasy Triangle between Parliament, Government and the Federal 
Laender’ in Sadurski (n 32); Jutta Limbach, ‘The Effects of the Jurisdiction of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 99/05, 19-21.   
88 While unease or disagreement about a particular judgment can be expressed, the judgment itself 
would not be resisted because the notion that the constitutional court is the institution that determines 
the meaning of the constitution will remain unchallenged.  
89 In addition, or alternatively, the (constitutional) legislature could look towards the possibility of 
overriding disagreeable judgments, either by means of a constitutional amendment or by making 
provision for a legislative override. For further discussion, see Maartje de Visser, ‘Constitutional 
Dialogues between Courts and Legislatures’, in Willem Witteveen and Maartje de Visser (eds), The 
Jurisprudence of Aharon Barak – Views from Europe (Wolf Legal Publishers 2011).  
90 62 BVerfG 1.  
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take care not to annul the resulting law merely because they would have preferred a 
different interpretation of the relevant provisions.91  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This contribution has considered selected aspects of how national constitutional 
courts they seek to secure or enhance their political legitimacy. Now, for these matters, 
there are no easy or quick-fix solutions, no fail-safe tips and tricks and no definite 
lists of ‘do’s’ and ‘don’ts’. For the European debate, one of the main lessons is to 
acknowledge that not all vectors of activism are fully within the control of the court. 
The political actors determine to a large extent the functions of, and gateways which 
enable access to the constitutional courts and hence the salience of these courts in 
deciding political and societal questions. In addition, national constitutional courts 
appear to alternate periods of judicial activism – for instance shortly after their 
inception to secure their position within the constitutional order – with periods of 
judicial restraint. The extent to which this is possible is however also dependent on 
the configuration of the political landscape and whether the polity is experiencing 
changes to its constitutional, social or economic system – or whether it is business as 
usual.  
Here the ECJ is in a less enviable position than most national constitutional courts, 
given the more dynamic pace of development and open-ended character of the Union. 
What is more, national constitutional courts are more grounded in their respective 
constitutional system and legal order. This makes it easier for them to be aware of the 
concerns of the various stakeholders and take these into account when adjudicating 
(even if this is not always done explicitly). Again, the Court faces more of a 
challenge: there is a greater asymmetry of information regarding the salience of 
political or otherwise sensitive issues within the Member States, and this is 
exacerbated by the fact that the concerns or interests of one Member State need not 
coincide with those of other Member States (e.g. those not a party to the litigation).92 
This can result in a greater likelihood of allegations of activism or the perception that 
rulings are motivated by a certain political agenda different from that pursued at the 
national level.  
Most, if not all, of the techniques to mitigate charges of activism involve trade-offs. 
For instance, should access be generous or limited; should deference be practiced; 
should a saving construction be used or a verdict of annulment be pronounced? These 
trade-offs usually boil down to a choice between the (perceived) virtue of judicial 
restraint and the observer’s perspective of what the role of the court should be in 
ensuring respect for the rule of law and within the constitutional system more 
generally. Now, the choice to be made here varies across countries, stakeholders, 
policy fields and time.93 To the extent that a choice would be made to counter or pre-
empt allegations of activism, one possible strategy that the ECJ may want to emulate 
concerns the way in which national constitutional courts communicate in their 
relationship with the political institutions. These courts frequently make use of 
                                                 
91 Again, if the court would arrive at the conclusion that the legislature’s interpretation cannot be 
sustained, it will have to be clear and persuasive in its reasoning, going back to the earlier point on the 
quality of judicial reason-giving.  
92 See also Takis Tridimas, ‘The Court of Justice and Judicial Activism’, (1996) 21 ELR 199, 202.  
93 For instance, the fact that the Union legislature is now more actively developing a fundamental rights 
policy may lead political actors to expect a greater degree of restraint on the part of the Court in view 
of the indeterminacy of fundamental rights, yet citizens could conversely expect the Court to be active 
in cultivating a strong (judicial) fundamental rights policy, depending on their own experiences with 
constitutional courts and fundamental rights in their own Member State.  
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deference rhetoric and reflections on the proper role of both court and legislature; 
have a balanced style of judicial reasoning and arrive at outcomes that stop short of 
annulling legislation, when this is possible. Even in those instances where these 
techniques are more a cloak for judicial activism than anything else, relying on them 
may still have a placatory effect. If the Court would do so, then hopefully this should 
ameliorate the quality and persuasiveness of reasoning, making it appear less as the 
proverbial bull in the china shop that it sometimes now comes across as.  
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